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NOTE
PROBLEMS OF RES JUDICATA CREATED BY
EXPANDING "CAUSE OF ACTION" UNDER CODE
PLEADING
The change in procedural law brought about as a result of the advent
of code pleading raises the question of the proper role of res judicata in the
code system. One of the basic attributes of code pleading is the abolition
of the distinction between law and equity. In place of these two systems of
independent trial courts, there is found one court which results from a
fusion of the former two. It was a major objective of the reform movement
to expand the permissible scope of one trial to enable resolution of an entire
controversy. Consequently, there arises the problem of the application of res
judicata to this expanded scope: to what extent should the full measure of
issues which could have been litigated fall within the doctrines of merger
and bar?
CONCEPTS OF RES JuDICATA

The broad field of law into which this Note fits is that dealing with
judgments. For many years there has been something of an eclipse of
legal analysis on the subject of judgments. The last comprehensive treatment in book form was the 1925 edition of Freeman's treatise.' In more
recent years, certain concepts have been defined and new descriptions devised, and it may be helpful briefly to review those which will be referred to
2
in this Note.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged or a thing judicially
acted upon or decided From long usage it has come to encompass generally the effect of one judgment upon a subsequent trial or proceeding.4
Two quite distinct aspects are included: first, the effect of a judgment in a
subsequent action between the parties based upon the same cause of action;
second, the effect on the parties in a trial on a different cause of action.5
Where the same cause of action is involved, the doctrine can be summarized: plaintiff's cause of action is merged in a final judgment if he wins,
1. 2 FREEMA,

JUDGMENTS

(5th ed. 1925).

2. The most recent broad treatment of res judicata is Developments in the La-Res Judicata,65 HARv. L. Rxv. 818 (1952).
3. BLAci, LAw DICTiONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1951).
4. Ibid. See also Developments in the Law--Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV.

818, 820 n.1 (1952).

5. See, e.g., Piro v. Shipley, 33 Pa. Super. 278, 281-83 (1907); von Moschzisker,

Res udicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 300-01 (1928) ;
68-72 (1942).
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or barred by it if he loses.6 The scope of the merger or bar includes not
only matters actually litigated but also all matters that should have been
litigated. 7 Frequently this doctrine is referred under the generic name of
res judicata, although it is sometimes termed "technical" res judicata to
distinguish it from its broader root.8 The second part of res judicata has
come to be known as collateral estoppel. 9 When the parties to a former
trial are litigating a different cause of action, any issue of fact and certain
issues of law, which were actually litigated and which were essential to
the judgment, are conclusively determined by the judgment in the initial
trial and cannot be relitigated or challenged. 10
This Note is primarily concerned with problems of "technical" res
judicata. The subject can be described as an inquiry into how much of the
expanded scope of trial made possible by the fusion of law and equity under
a system of code pleading is properly translated into "matter that should
have been litigated" for purposes of invocation of the doctrines of merger
or bar. To do so, it is helpful first to consider the application of these doctrines in a jurisdiction where there has been no fusion.
RELATIONSHIP OF EQUITY DECREES AND
LEGAL JUDGMENTS BEFORE FUSION

In jurisdictions administering law and equity in independent systems
of trial courts, that very independence was a primary factor in the development of a set of doctrines defining the relationship between rulings of the
two court systems. Since they were administered separately, in the normal
course of events, a plaintiff entitled to recovery from both might obtain his
relief via two proceedings. Similarly, in some instances where the legal
and equitable remedies were alternatives, two trials could come about if
the plaintiff first pursued a remedy which was denied him for reasons not
precluding his recovery of the other. In these cases, a judgment or decree,
for or against him, did not necessarily bring into play the doctrines of
merger or bar.
Most of the litigation involving a combination of legal and equitable
elements began with the equity suit followed by the action at law. At some
point, the chancellor developed a procedure whereby the necessity for the
second trial was eliminated. Having obtained jurisdiction to try the equitable
issues, the chancellor continued to dispose of the legal issues in order to
6.

RESTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS

§§47, 48 (1942).

7. For an excellent statement of the doctrine, see von Moschzisker, supra note 5,

at 300.
8. See 103 U. PA. L. REv. 273, 274 (1954).
9. See Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3 n.4 (1942),
for a discussion of the reasoning of the authors of the Restatement of Judgments
for using the phrase.

10. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 840 (1952);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 68(1), 70 (1942).
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terminate the entire controversy in one trial. 1 In this process, which has
been aptly described as "equitable clean-up," 12 there are two discretionary
elements. First, an option lies with the plaintiff whether or not to seek
clean-up.' 3 If he does not request it, neither the defendant nor the chancellor could move to dispose of the legal part of the case. The failure to
ask for resolution of the entire controversy was not penalized on the ground
that plaintiff had split his cause of action. 14 The second discretionary
element in an equitable clean-up case lay with the chancellor who could
determine whether or not to grant the plaintiff's request, if made.' 5
When the first part of the case completed was the equitable, the
problem of res judicata was whether plaintiff's cause of action was barred
if he lost, or merged into the decree if he won. If the plaintiff had asked
only for equitable relief which was denied, or if the plaintiff sought clean-up
and was denied both remedies, the important question determinative of
whether a later action was barred was the basis for the chancellor's denial of
the equitable remedy.'
For example, the chancellor may have found that
an equity court lacked jurisdiction to decide the controversy. Dismissal on
such a ground by a court of law or equity is not deemed a final adjudication
for purposes of "technical" res judicata. 17 On the other hand, the chancellor may have denied the equitable relief on a principle of a "court of
conscience," such as laches, unclean hands, etc. Again it was held that
the plaintiff was not barred from proceeding at law for his legal remedy.'
A different level of cases includes those in which the equity court decided the
11. 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 181, 231 (5th ed., Symons 1941).
LANGDFLL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION 67 (2d ed. 1908).

12. See Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 320 (1951).

13. The option to seek equitable clean-up was not available in all law-equity combinations. See, e.g., Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 594 (1928), an anti-trust case in which the court
granted an injunction but refused damages because of necessity of a jury trial to settle
the issue of treble damages.
Sometimes the equitable decree is made conditional upon the legal judgment.
Cases of injunction against nuisance may result in the chancellor's granting equitable
relief unless the defendant pays the sum specified as damages. See authorities collected
in Keeton and Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEXAs L. REv. 412, 420-21
Although in theory such an award includes both legal and equitable
n.23 (1940).
remedies, it raises independent considerations of the relationship of judgments of
law and equity.
14. See text at notes 15-25 infra.
15. See Levin, supra note 12, at 339-46.
16. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §65(2), comments h, i (1942); 2 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 646 (5th ed. 1925).
17. See Developments in the Law-Res .rudicata, 65 H v. L. REv. 818, 835-39
(1952).
18. Linnertz v. Dorway, 246 Ill. 485, 92 N.E. 938 (1910); Farmers' and
Mechanics' Life Ass'n v. Caine, 224 Ill. 599, 79 N.E. 956 (1907); Lewis v. Baker,
151 Pa. 529, 25 Atl. 99 (1892); Haue v. Thum, 67 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1953)
(dictum). See Coo, EQUITY 1116-26 (4th ed., Van Hecke 1948), and note 16 supra.
A recent study indicates that this freedom to seek legal rights in a court of law
is almost completely theoretical, since, in practical effect, there are defenses cognizable
at law corresponding to most equitable defenses. Frank and Endicott, Defenses it
Equity and "Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REv. 380 (1954).
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case on its merits against the plaintiff. If the litigation involved an issue that
would be pivotal in a subsequent legal trial, then the docrine of collateral
estoppel is sufficient to foreclose a successful second day in court.19 For
example, an equity decree denying specific performance was based on a
holding that the contract sought to be enforced is invalid; a later action for
damages for breach of the contract cannot succeed if the equity finding on a
matter actually litigated and essential to the decree is accepted as binding.2
Many of the equity-law cases involving res judicata do not go beyond collateral estoppel, since the difficulty arises from the overlap of issues more
than the failure to litigate issues that should have been adjudicated. That is
not to say, however, that "technical" res judicata was not applied in this
type of case. An example is the suit for specific performance of a contract
which was terminated before the taking of evidence. In a later action for
damages based on the same contract, the court found that the earlier dismissal was with prejudice and invoked the doctrine of bar to prevent
recovery.21 Since there were no issues actually litigated, the result cannot
rest on collateral estoppel.
If the plaintiff was successful in his equity suit, it was held that he
could still bring an action at law for further relief if his cause of action
warranted both legal and equitable remedies.P The law of collateral
estoppel frequently lightened the burden of proof by preventing relitigation
of matters already threshed out in the equity suit which were material to
the action at law. For example, when a decree in chancery adjudicated a
dispute over title to certain land, this was held conclusive as to plaintiff's
title when he later brought an action for ejectment.2 On he other hand,
the plaintiff was precluded from recovery at law where the legal remedy is
but an alternate form of relief for the equitable remedy. This latter concept
was generally thought of, not as res judicata, but rather in the frame of
reference of election of remedies.
It nevertheless expressed in part the
finality which law courts accorded to decrees in equity.
When the sequence of events was such that the proceeding in the law
court came before the suit in equity, similar doctrines were used.25 One
19. E.g., Windolph v. Lippincott, 107 N.J.L. 468, 155 Ati. 23 (1931); Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon, 136 N.Y. 465, 32 N.E. 1058 (1893); May-

field Co. v. Rushing, 133 Tex. 120, 127 S.W.2d 185 (1939).

See cases collected in

CooK, op. cit. supra note 18.
20. Windolph v. Lippincott, supra note 19; Mayfield Co. v. Rushing, supra note 19.

See also Smith v. Haymond, 135 W. Va. 638, 64 S.E.2d 105 (1951).
21. Ogsbury v. La Farge, 2 N.Y. 113 (1848).
22. Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, ll S.W. 374
(1908) ; Morency v. Plourde, 96 N.H. 344, 76 A.2d 791 (1950) ; Chapman v. General
Petroleum Corp., 152 Ore. 147, 52 P.2d 190 (1935) ; Perdue v. Ward, 88 W. Va. 371,
106 S.E. 874 (1921). All of these cases involved an action for legal relief after a
successful suit for injunctive relief.
23. Hutchinson v. Patterson, 226 Mo. 174, 126 S.W. 403 (1910).
24. See, e.g., 5 CoaRiN, CoNTRAcTs §§ 1222, 1223 (1951).

25. E.g., in suits for specific performance after an action for damages: Connihan v.
Thompson, 111 Mass. 270 (1873); Otto v. Young, 227 Mo. 193, 127 S.W. 9 (1910);
Van Buren v. Fine, 101 N.J. Eq. 373, 139 At. 486 (Ch. 1927). But see Belding v.
Whittington, 154 Ark. 561, 243 S.W. 808 (1922).
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special situation arose in cases which frequently developed in law before
equity. Often a party to a contract sued for breach of the contract as'
expressed in a written document. Finding to his dismay that a provision in
the document prevents his recovering, he moved over to equity where he
filed suit to reform, strike out or modify the fatal clause. 26 It was sometimes held that, if plaintiff had adopted a position of fact in the legal action
(e.g., the document contains the contract), he was precluded from changing
that position in the suit in equity (e.g., a clause in the contract should be
striken or modified).27 When the fact is crucial to any recovery, the rule
in effect denied relief to.the plaintiff. In a closely related type of case,
however, the courts would not preclude the plaintiff from seeking reformation after having lost in an action on the contract. Thus, if the plaintiff
in the case above had maintained throughout the legal action that the critical
clause was not operative because of a parol agreement of the parties, but
lost because the court is powerless to receive evidence contradicting the
28
written contract, then the equity suit was allowed to reform the agreement.
This interrelationship of law and equity was not above quite valid
objections. The first and most obvious criticism could be directed toward
a procedure which necessitated the .parties carrying on two completely
independent suits in order to accomplish what might be effected into one
proceeding. Moreover, the existence of two independent systems, each according finality to judgments of the other, could also produce monuments to
the injustice of inflexible application of technical rules of law like the
29
famous case of Read v. Allen.
This multiple trial problem began in a court of equity with a bill of
interpleader that had been filed by a real estate manager to determine which
of two disputing heirs was entitled to rents of an estate that had passed
under an ambiguous will. The chancellor, after the hearing, decreed that
A should prevail over B. B appealed this decision. While that appeal
was pending, A instituted an action at law for ejectment to establish his
legal title to disputed land. Despite B's efforts to stay the proceedings until
the appeal had been disposed of, a judgment for A was entered on the
ground that the equity interpleader decree was collateral estoppel in the
ejectment action. Later, after the time for taking an appeal from the
ejectment ruling had passed, the appellate court reversed the interpleader
decree and found that B, not A, was really entitled to the land under the
will. Thereupon, B began an ejectment action against A to recover the
land now determined rightfully to be his. Ultimately the United States
26. Washington v. Sander, 167 Ark. 420, 268 S.W. -60-4- (1925)-; Washbunv..
Great Western Ins. Co., 114 Mass. '175 (1873); -Note, Election of Remedies: A
Delusion?, 38 CoLurn. L. REv. 292, 300 n.64 (1938).

27. See cases cited in note 26 supra.
28. Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 203 U.S. 106 (1906);
Sadowski v. General Discount Corp., 81 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Mich. 1948), aff'd,
183 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1950).

29. 286 U.S. 191 (1932).
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Supreme Court held that the first ejectment action, although based entirely
on a decree that had been overruled, was res judicata and could not be
collaterally attacked. B tried once more, this time in equity. He asked
to have A declared to be a constructive trustee of the land for the benefit of
B3
The court of appeals refused, again relying on the ground of res
judicata; the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Professor Moore made this comment about the case:
"The set of operative facts was sufficient to give rise to an equitable action of interpleader and a legal action in ejectment, but insuffident to found the basis of a third cause of action which would do
simple justice between the parties! If when a set of operative facts
which should be handled as a suit is split up into conceptual causes of
action that produce the above solution, it should be clear that the
administration of justice can be better served by treating a set of
operative facts in a pragmatic fashion." 3 1
Read v. Allen undoubtedly makes a strong argument for proponents of
a system of code pleading. If one trial had resolved both the legal and
equitable issues, the disastrous confusion of finality of judgments would not
have occurred. The question then arises whether a reform of the system that led to Read v. Allen, whereby the parties are required to resolve
their entire controversy in one trial, raises problems that also can result in
a denial of justice.
RELATIONSHIP OF EQUITY DECREES AND

LEGAL JUDGMENTS AFTER FUSION

In many instances, the adoption of code pleading has resulted in a
change in the law of res judicata as applied to cases that involve a combination of law and equity. Because of the fusion of these two formerly
independent bodies of law, it is now possible for a plaintiff to obtain full
relief in one proceeding. 32 Proponents of code pleading point to this
opportunity to settle the entire controversy as one of the advantages of
the reform. However, the desirability of translating this opportunity to
obtain full relief into a requirement that every plaintiff do so by barring any
subsequent action is the nub of the res judicata problem.
Illustrative of the decisions of courts following fusion is the leading
case of Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co.P A hotel owner sued a fish company to
enjoin a nuisance and for damages of $50,000. The court granted the
30. Allen v. Johnson, 70 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 572 (1934).
31. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 388 (2d ed. 1948). For other comment, see
authorities collected in CLARK, CODE PLEADING 475 n.152 (2d ed. 1947).
32. Even under a fused system, it is not necessarily true that the plaintiff, having
been denied equitable relief, can have clean-up. See Levin, supra note 12.
33. 86 Minn. 365, 90 N.W. 767 (1902).
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injunction but denied any recovery in damages because of insufficient pleading of that claim. Subsequently, the hotel owner brought a separate action
for damages and was met with the defense of res judicata. The Minnesota
court held that the action was barred. According to the court it was
immaterial that the plaintiff had unsuccessfully pleaded for damages in the
first trial; indeed, it would have made no difference if he had not attempted
to recover damages at all. 34 Inasmuch as both legal and equitable rights
can be enforced in one action in Minnesota, the plaintiff had but one
cause of action which he has split, and res judicata precludes further
proceedings.
This rule is deemed proper by Judge Charles E. Clark, who, in his
treatise Code Pleading, writes:
"There seems no occasion for adopting the inconvenient rule that
there are separate causes of action for each claim, legal or equitable;
in fact to do so would be to set aside the well-settled rule of res
judicata applied before the codes, namely, that matter once threshed
out either at law or in equity could not be again litigated in the other
tribunal. Formerly a litigant in the wrong court was not thereby
prevented from going into the other court; but there is no longer
occasion for that particular rule. Hence the rule against splitting a
cause of action is properly applied to prevent the litigation of legal
and equitable claims on such cause at different times." 35
This rule, used in the Gilbert case, and approved by Judge Clark, is
quite inflexible. It purports to admit of no exceptions. Its underlying
theory is that litigants should be forced to make use of the new and
improved processes of code pleading. However, the invocation of the
doctrine of "technical" res judicata in any case, not necessarily one involving a law-equity combination, is a very harsh step.3 6 It is one of the few
procedural devices or rules for the violation of which the penalty is complete loss of remedy. Some courts have attempted to find exceptions 37 or
34. Accord, Crawford v. Baker, 86 Ga. App. 855, 72 S.E.2d 790 (1952); Naugle
v. Naugle, 89 Kan. 622, 132 Pac. 164 (1913); Thompson v. Myrick, 24 Minn. 4
(1877); Inderlied v. Whaley, 85 Hun. 63, 32 N.Y. Supp. 640 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
Similar results have been reached where a party fails to raise a defense in the initial
action and later returns as a plaintiff, relying on the substance of that defense.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Baking Co., 306 Mass. 428, 28 N.E.2d 425 (1940);
Wholey v. Columbia Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 69 R.I. 254, 32 A.2d 791 (1943). This
result may follow even though the court hearing the initial suit did not have jurisdiction to grant defendant his due relief. Fairview-Chase Corp. v. Scharf, 225
App. Div. 232, 232 N.Y. Supp. 530 (1st Dep't 1929); Yager v. Bedell, 206 App. Div.
803, 201 N.Y. Supp. 466 (3d Dep't 1923).
35. CLAR, CODE PLEADING 475-76 (2d ed. 1947).
36. Cleary, Res JudicataReexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 349 (1948), citing Judge
Clark's dissent in Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945).
37. E.g., International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl.
132, 56 F.2d 708 (1932); In re 431 Oakdale Ave. Bldg. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 63
(N.D. Ill. 1939); Saypol v. Wolf, 165 Misc. 517, 1 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1937);

Hyydi v. Smith, 67 N.D. 425, 272 N.W. 747 (1937); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 905 (1943).
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manipulated "cause of action" language in a very strange fashion.38 Writers
have re-analyzed the doctrine to sift out the purposes for which it exists.85
It is appropriate to consider these purposes of the res judicata doctrine
in cases involving combinations of legal and equitable remedies in order to
determine whether those purposes will be served by making the entire
possible controversy under code pleading subject to the rules of merger
or bar.
Underlying Rationale of "Technical" Res Judicata
4
There are five principal bases underlying the doctrine of res judicata. 0
They explain why a legal system must afford a measure of finality to
decisions of its courts. One of the most 'often expressed is the desire
to free defendants from vexatious litigation at the hands of a plaintiff
who brings successive suits. Once the matter has been threshed out
in a fair proceeding before a competent tribunal, the defendant should
not be put to the expense and trouble of defending again, whether he won
or lost in the initial trial. Closely related to this basis, in the sense of
primary concern for the parties involved, is the danger of double recovery.
If a plaintiff, who has already been granted relief by one court, is permitted
to relitigate his claim before another, there is a possibility that the remedy
of the second will overlap or duplicate that of the first.
The other three bases deal less with the individual parties in the suit
in question and focus, rather, upon the dictates of an efficient judicial
process. There is a limit to the number of cases that the courts can handle
in any given period. Since there are usually many litigants waiting to be
heard, the expeditious disposal of claims necessitates that courts economize
in the time spent on any one case. One way this is effected is by making
the first determination final. In addition, it is clearly desirable from the
standpoint both of the parties and the administration of justice that we
have a court system that produces stable decisions, upon which reliance
can be placed, and that there be a preclusion of inconsistent results.
Two of the justifications for barring a plaintiff after one trial are subject to some limitation when viewed in light of the problem of whether or
not to allow separate trials for the legal and equitable segments of a case.
One of *theseis the goal of freeing the defendant from vexatious litigation.
This is frequently mentioned in reference to preventing a plaintiff from
dividing up his total claim into many claims aggregating his total and
bringing suit on each and every one of the fractions. This consideration
seems less convincing in the law-equity problem. There the upper limit

38. Compare the language of General Discount Corp. v. Sadowski, 183 F.2d 542
(6th Cir. 1950), with Crawford v. Baker, 86 Ga. App. 855, 72 S.E.2d 790 (1952).
39. E.g., Cleary, Res udicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948) ; Schopflocher,
What Is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?,
21 OmE L. R~v. 319, 321 (1942).
40. Most of these are described in Cleary, supra note 39, at 344-45.
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of possible suits is generally two. For the same reason, the argument that
it is necessary to economize in the use of court time to resolve any one
dispute is not so strong. This qualification by no means removes the
impact of these two factors, however. Even if the problem means only
division of the case into two proceedings, the burden on both the parties
and the court system can be quite serious. The administrative aspect alone
of insuring that the parties, their attorneys and the witnesses are available
when the court is ready to hear a case can encompass much loss of time
and considerable expense. Added to that is the duplication of assessable
costs and other similar expenses. And although the doctrine of collateral
estoppel can be invoked to prevent relitigation of matters previously
decided, there can develop a divergence of views as to what was actually
decided so that one of the major problems in the trial becomes the litigation
over the collateral estoppel issue itself. It is easily possible to minimize
unduly the practical impact of even a division of one trial into two.
In evaluating the other rationale for the existence of the doctrine of
"technical" res judicata as applied to cases of mixed law-equity nature, it
is helpful to recognize that there are three basic patterns which characterize
the relationship of the legal part of the case to the equitable. The first is
that in which the equitable remedy is given in addition to the legal. This
is exemplified by the case in which the plaintiff seeks and is entitled to
both an equitable injunction and legal damages.41 Another familiar example is the specific performance-damages combination. The second pattern
is closely related to this first. In one sense this too involves additional
relief, but the initial remedy is merely a preliminary step toward the heart
of the litigation. This covers the case of the equitable decree of reforma42
tion of a contract preceding an action at law for breach of the contract.
Generally the reformation decree is not sought as an end in itself, althouglh
it is not inconceivable that two parties to a contract might frame a suit in
the procedural setting of a request for reformation in order to settle ambiguities in the contract writing or to determine the effect of extrinsic matter
upon the writing, in a manner comparable to a declaratory judgment action,
where both are ready and willing to perform under the contract according
to the outcome of the litigation.
The third pattern of relationship between legal and equitable remedies
is the situation wherein the two are alternatives. A land purchaser may
The
seek either specific performance or damages for breach of contract.4
It is in
defrauded buyer can pursue his remedy either at law or in equity.
41. E.g., Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co., 87 Minn. 365, 90 N.W. 767 (1902).
42. See, e.g., Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 203 U.S. 106
(1906) ; General Discount Corp. v. Sadowski, 183 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1950) ; Cohen v.
Globe Indemnity Co., 37 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Gibson v. American Ins. Co.,
146 Fla. 171, 200 So. 357 (1941).

43. E.g., Mayfield Co. v. Rushing, 133 Tex. 120, 127 S.W.2d 185 (1939); and

cases collected in Annot., 124 A.L.R. 1214 (1940).
44. Weigel v. Cook, 237 N.Y. 136, 142 N.E. 444 (1923).
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this type of case that courts frequently indulge in "vague dissertations"
45
about election of remedies instead of discussing "technical" res judicata.
Cleary suggests that this indicates judicial dissatisfaction with the doctrine
of res judicata, since, by utilizing election of remedies language, courts
frequently can find that the plaintiff is not barred from coming into court
46
again after an unsuccessful first try.
Before fusion, each of these three types of law-equity related remedies
generally could be sought in two trials without running afoul of the doctrine of technical" res judicata,47 although in some states the election of
remedies might effectively prevent recovery of alternative relief.48 Only
in the equitable clean-up case could the plaintiff obtain his full measure of recovery in one trial by asking the chancellor for both remedies, if
they were supplementary, or either, if they were alternatives.
With respect to the danger of double recovery, the first two categories
of relationship of remedies are ex hypothesis outside the rationale. Where
the equitable decree is authorized in addition to or is a preliminary for the
legal recovery, the fact that a plaintiff recovers in two suits does not mean
that he receives more than that to which he is entitled. However, it is a
very real factor in the third class where the remedies are alternatives and
plaintiff has been successful in the initial trial. In McCreary v. Stallworth 49 a purchaser sued and won specific performance of a land sale
contract with an abatement in the purchase price because of the vendor's
inability to convey more than a five-eighth's interest in the property.
Then plaintiff brought an action against the vendor for breach of
contract and sought money damages for the same delict. Any recovery
would have been a double recovery, since the initial suit completely
resolved the controversy. A similar danger can arise where a legal action
has preceded the suit in equity 0° "Technical" res judicata is properly
invoked in such cases whether or not there has been a fusion of law and

equity.
One of the curious aspects of the problem of double recovery when
legal and equitable remedies are alternatives is found in the famous case
of Hahl v. Sugo. 01 Defendant had erected a building which encroached
a few inches onto the plaintiff's land. Plaintiff secured a judgment in an
action for ejectment, but the sheriff refused to execute the judgment since
45. Cleary, supra note 39, at 349, citing Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St 299,
52 N.E.2d 67 (1943), as an example.
46. Ibid.
47. See text at notes 15-25 supra.
48. See text following note 25 supra.
49. 212 Ala. 238, 102 So. 52 (1924).
50. Cf. Medley v. Brown, 202 S.W. 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). (Plaintiff sued
and recovered damages for loss of value of his land when the state built a bridge
restricting ingress; later he raised his house and sued to enjoin the state from restricting the entranceway to the raised house.)
51. 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901). For commentary on this case, see materials collected in CLA x, CoD. PLADING 475 n.151 (2d ed. 1947).
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removal of the few inches of the building that were trespassing would
result in collapse of the entire building. Then plaintiff instituted a second
suit to enjoin defendant to remove his own building. The defense of
"technical" res judicata carried the day. Analytically, this type of situation
does not involve the danger of double recovery in the sense of plaintiff
receiving $100 for a $50 injury by suing twice. It is merely a case in
which there were two means to accomplish one end, namely removal of
the encroachment. The means first chosen, an ejectment action, turned
out to be a pyrrhic victory.52 Here plaintiff lost all chance of effective
relief by the fortuitous twist that he happened to have won in the initial
trial. It is difficult to see much practical difference, however, between this
plaintiff and one who brought an action on the contract, lost under the
terms of a written contract, and thereafter sued for reformation to add,
strike or modify a provision of the agreement.58 In both cases plaintiff
initially made an error as to the legal road to recovery; in neither does the
first judgment necessarily preclude a later suit by virtue of collateral
estoppel, i.e., substantively, no impediment lies in the path of the second
type of remedy because of the first suit. Nevertheless, in one case
"technical" res judicata is applied and in the other plaintiff is free to try
again.
The category of cases in which the legal and equitable remedies are
alternatives is also the biggest problem area in terms of stability of judicial
decisions and preclusion of inconsistent results. If the two are supplemnentary, the result in the initial litigation is generally carried over to the
second by way of collateral estoppel so that the decision is not collaterally
attacked but rather is used as the keystone of the later action.5 4 However,
where the remedies are alternatives and plaintiff lost the first suit, there is
the danger that a later action for the alternate remedy may be only a subterfuge for relitigating matter that should be permanently decided. This
type of case is sometimes treated by a good faith test of plaintiff's first
choice of remedy,5 5 while elsewhere plaintiff is given greater leeway when
the doctrine of election of remedies is used and the theory followed that
there has been no election unless two choices did in fact exist.58 Heavy
52. A similar situation arose in Pennsylvania when plaintiff won an injunction
to protect an easement across defendant's land, but the defendant had destroyed
possibility of use of the easement. It was held that plaintiff could recover full damages even though he already had an injunction. Piro v. Shipley, 33 Pa. Super. 278
(1907). But cf. Helistern v. Hellstern, 279 N.Y. 327, 18 N.E.2d 296 (1938) ; Schmidt
v. Weyell, 60 Misc. 370, 113 N.Y. Supp. 630 (Sup. Ct. 1908).

53. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
54. Cf. Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, 111 S.W. 374
(1909).
55. See, e.g., 2 RESTATmmENT, CoNTmAcTs § 383 (1932).
56. See Justices Brandeis, Holmes and Taft dissenting in United States v.
Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 302 (1922) ; Justice Cardozo in Schenck v. State
Line Telephone Co., 238 N.Y. 308, 144 N.E. 592 (1924); Norwood v. McDonald,
142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1944).
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emphasis is placed upon a kind of estoppel.67 When these analyses are
used, the court is finding a way to allow a plaintiff to present his claim,
even though once defeated, because the defeat stemmed from a basis not
applicable to the alternate remedy.
In a jurisdiction that has fused law and equity, it is easy to hold
that plaintiff might have sought both the legal and equitable remedies
alternatively and should not be allowed to do so by way of two suits.
Such was the reasoning of the court in a recent New Jersey decision,
Ajamian v. Schlanger.8 There a defrauded purchaser doggedly pursued
the equitable remedy of rescission, although the court found it should have
been obvious that either laches or ratification would prevent recovery. 9
After an adverse judgment, plaintiff sought money damages for legal
fraud, against which laches and ratification are no defense. The court
barred the claim.
It is interesting to compare the opinions from the New Jersey Superior
and Supreme Courts. There were three opinions filed in the lower court.
The judges were divided over the proper application of the doctrine of
election of remedies. All agreed that it was inappropriate to deem an
election to have been made unless the plaintiff had in fact two inconsistent
remedies. The opinion of the court found that he had not,60 the dissent
disagreed, 61 and the concurring opinion noted that the position of the
dissent represented the older view which was being displaced by the
majority view.6 2 In the Supreme Court the decision did not turn on this
issue; that opinion centered upon the recent adoption of code pleading in
New Jersey and the desirability of deciding the "entire controversy" in
one trial. Failure of the plaintiff to pursue his legal remedy in the first trial
was termed "highly imprudent."'
Later the court found that it amounted
to a "deliberate and conscious waiver of his legal remedy." 64
The court was clearly not concerned about preclusion of inconsistent
results.6
It was admitted that the precise grounds for the decision in the
rescission trial were inapplicable to the claim for damages. This was not an
attempt to attack collaterally a previously unfavorable judgment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey was announcing that the opportunity provided
by the new procedure to settle an entire controversy in one trial would
57. Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co., 238 N.Y. 308, 309, 144 N.E. 592,
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1220 (1951).
58. 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 835 (1954).
59. Id. at 488, 103 A.2d at 12.
60. Ajamian v. Schlanger, 29 N.J. Super. 497, 500, 103 A.2d 3, 4 (App. Div.
1953).
61. Id. at 507, 103 A.2d at 9.
62. Id. at 501, 103 A.2d at 5.
63. 14 N.J. at 486, 103 A.2d at 11.
64. Id. at 488, 103 A.2d at 12.
65. The decision has been said not to be based on election of remedies, but rather
on estoppel caused by weakness of counsel. 5 Co Iin, CONTRAcrs § 1225 (Supp. 1954).

593 (1924).
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henceforth be a requirement. In the future a plaintiff, thinking that he has
the choice of alternative remedies, will be "highly imprudent" to press for
the more desirable of the two until judgment if he is mistaken as to its
availability. Rather, the court expects him to ask for both in the alternative
and to choose one or the other, at the latest at the close of proof. Although
the rationale was not the danger of inconsistency, the court may be said to
have been concerned with the necessity for stable judicial decisions. The
opinion specifically expressed concern for the possibility of multiplicity of
suits if the entire controversy were divisible.6"
It seems a fair conclusion from the analysis of the rationale of res
judicata in the context of the law-equity problems that there is some justification for desiring to end the entire controversy in one trial. Although
some of the arguments are less convincing, perhaps, in this context than
generally, there is still much benefit to be derived from preventing the
divers disadvantages resulting from a multiplicity of suits. Therefore, it
is pertinent to find and evaluate what basis there is for a counter-argument
-that the parties should be allowed to divide the litigation according to the
former pattern of trials at law and in equity, even though the advent of
code pleading means that both trials would be in the same court and that
both could have been treated in one proceeding.
Sources of Pressurefor Permitting Division of the Controversy
The root of any argument against requiring that litigants take advantage of the benefits made possible by fusion of law and equity under code
pleading is the fact that complete fusion has not, probably cannot be
effected. While many of the characteristics of the former practice have
been obliterated, there remain vestiges of the distinctions that developed
between the two systems which vitally affect the substantive rights of the
parties. A discussion of three of them will point up the problem: the
right to trial by jury, the desire for the same measure of recovery possible
before fusion, and the relationship of the right to amend with the degree to
which the pleadings control the course of the trial.
The Right to Trial by Jury
It has been indicated that the greatest single obstacle blocking a complete fusion of law and equity in code pleading jurisdictions is the problem
of the mode of trial.67 Embodied in constitutions and statutes are provisions which guarantee litigants a right to jury trial, and generally that right
is defined in terms of historical perspective.P This creates a dilemma that
is difficult of solution: on one hand the code pleading reform purports to
66. 14 N.J. at 486, 103 A.2d at 12.
67. Levin, supra note 12, at 321-22.
68. Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Merged Procedures, 65 HARv. L. REV.
453-54 (1952).
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abolish distinctions between law and equity; on the other, problems of right
69
The more
to jury trial must be answered in terms of those distinctions.
successful the code is in obliterating any differences that existed, the more
70
difficult it becomes to determine mode of trial under the code.
Much has been written to help solve the difficulty. "The considerable
scholarship addressed to the dilemma has variously produced vast schemes
of classification, monuments of historical research, and what seem simplifications of the problem. The variety of answers may attest to the complexity of the problem.. ."71 There have been suggestions that the entire
action be tried to the jury or court according to whether the case is
"predominantly" legal and "incidentally" equitable, or vice versa. 72 Others
have suggested that all cases be tried by jury, 73 or that the various questions of fact be assigned according to the inherent capabilities of the jury
or judge to decide them."4 The most widely accepted solution is the "split
trial" with the issues being tried in their appropriate mode by an historical
7
test."

The major difficulty with the "split trial" technique is that historically
the same issue could arise in either law or equity cases; it was the com6
bination of issues that set the character of the action, not one issue itself."
Proponents of "split trials" differ as to the proper way to overcome this.
Some would have a "basic nature of the issue" test;"7 another suggestion
78
turns upon the "preferred theory of the pleadings" by the plaintiff.
Pike and Fischer would classify the cases into three groups depending upon
whether, before fusion, one trial or two trials were required or the plaintiff
had the option to seek relief in one or two trials. 79 If plaintiff had to
obtain fuU relief in one action, the mode of trial under fusion would be
the same as before.80 If plaintiff had to recover in two trials, they were
69. McCasldll, Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure,88 U. PA. L. REv.
315 (1940).
70. Ibid.
71. Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1952).
72. Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1940), adopted such a view from
the language of Fa. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
73. See, e.g., Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv. 157

(1953).

74. Note, 65 HARV. L. REV. 453, 465-66 (1952).
75. The phrase, "split trial," is used to describe trials that combine legal issues
and equitable issues. The former are tried by jury, the latter by the court. See
Kharas, A Century of Law--Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 186,
205 (1949); Morris, Jury Trial Under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity, 20
TExAs L. Rxv. 427 (1942).
76. McCaskdll, Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. Rxv.
315 (1940).
77. 5 MooRE, FFDERAL PRACTIcE 148-58 (1951).
78. Morris, Jury Trial Under the FederalFusion of Law and Equity, 20 TEXAs L.
REv. 427 (1942).
79. Pike & Fischer, Pleadings and Jury Rights in the New Federal Procedure,
88 U. PA. L. REv. 645, 654-59 (1940).
80. Id. at 658-59.
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distinct enough to enable division in the "split trial." 8 ' And where the
plaintiff had the option to seek equitable clean-up or not, the mode of trial
depended not upon the character of the pleading but simply on whether
or not the plaintiff asked for both legal and equitable relief from the chancellor. They conclude that the same distinction is operative after fusion;
plaintiff still has control of the mode of trial through his choice to bring
two suits or one.82 Where plaintiff seeks resolution of the entire controversy in one trial, by analogy to equitable clean-up, the case is tried without
a jury. To save a right to jury trial, plaintiff merely divides his case into
two parts.
Pike and Fischer's determination that, in the third category, a joinder
of claims for legal and equitable relief operates to make the case one for the
court 83 is closely akin to the doctrine of waiver of the right to jury that
has developed, particularly in the New York courts.8 4 Unfortunately, the
second trial upon which Pike and Fischer rely to save the right to the jury
trial is not possible if the doctrine of "technical" res judicata is invoked
to compel disposal of the entire controversy in one proceeding. The effect
of applying the doctrine of waiver or the Pike and Fischer rule together
with that of res judicata is brought out sharply in Sklarsky v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co.8s Grocer, in leasing his store, had secured from Landlord a covenant prohibiting any competitor of Grocer from leasing any of
the Landlord's other adjoining stores. The A & P, with knowledge of the
covenant, leased one of Landlord's nearby stores. Grocer obtained an
injunction from a New York state court requiring the A & P to vacate.
Thereafter Grocer brought an action for damages in a federal district court.
The court held that the claim was barred by "technical" res judicata,
although it candidly admitted in the opinion that, had Grocer joined his
demands for an injunction and damages, he would not have been entitled to
trial by jury on the damage issue. The court stated that Grocer "...
had
his election and he took it." so
This position is undoubtedly an extreme one among the proponents
of the "split trial" technique, but it highlights the failure of many states
to devise a process under code pleading that allows the same use of jury
trial as was found under pre-code practice. So long as that prevails there
will be occasions in which one or the other of the parties to a suit will
believe that his legal position would be stronger under the former practice.
To the extent that the code has made modifications, there will be pressure
to allow a division of the trial of the case into two hearings so that the
81. Id. at 655-56.
82. Id. at 656-68.
83. If plaintiff ". . . brings one [action], he should not get it [i.e., jury trial];
nor should the defendant." Id. at 656.
84. DiMenna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917) ; Kharas,
supra note 75, at 202. See also CLAap, CODE PLEADING 120-22 (2d ed. 1947).
85. 47 F.2d 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
86. Id. at 665.
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historical mode of trial can be used. This is the source of pressure to
of "technical"
exempt the second trial of a law-equity case from the doctrine
87
res judicata which would otherwise stymie two trials.
The Desire for the Same Measure of Recovery
A second reason for opposing a requirement that an entire controversy
be resolved in one trial, enforced by operation of the doctrine of "technical"
res judicata, is the possibility that the compulsory single trial may result in
a lesser recovery than the plaintiff otherwise would have received in two
trials. There are two ways in which this can come about: one is a matter
of timing of recovery; the second stems from the different rules of law and
equity on the measure of damages.
The analysis of the difficulty of the timing of relief can be begun with
the case of June v. George C. Peterson Co.8s Lessor had deposited certain
bonds with his Lessee to insure his compliance with the terms of the lease.
Later Lessee threatened to sell the bonds, and Lessor sued for an injunction
which was denied because of "unclean hands." Thereafter Lessee did
sell the bonds and Lessor brought an action for damages. Although essentially the same conduct and the same contract were the basis of both trials,
the court held the defense of "technical" res judicata inapplicable. It seems
virtually impossible to argue for a different result. At the time of the
injunction suit, there was no ground for seeking damages since the bonds
had not been sold.89
The impossibility of combining the request for an equitable injunction
and legal damages in one trial is sharply etched in the June case. It is no
less of a factor, however, in other circumstances. Gilbert v. Boak Fish
Co. 9° is illustrative. The trial court refused the damage claim because of
insufficient pleading of the claim, although the injunction was granted.
Later, when plaintiff again sought damages after remedying the defect of
the prior suit, the action was held to be barred by "technical" res judicata.
The opinion does not indicate what the defect was in plaintiff's case that
warranted denial of recovery in the first trial. However, it may have been
the result of the different type of facts that must be adduced to substantiate
a claim for legal rather than equitable relief. In a case like Gilbert, the
injunction will be granted on a showing of the existence of a nuisance and
87. Of course, the pressure could equally be directed toward modification of the
rules determining right to jury trial rather than res judicata. It is the coexistence
of the two that creates the problem. However, a substantial modification of the
right to jury trial would be possible only by constitutional amendment in most states,
while res judicata is a judicially enunciated principle.

88. 155 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1946).
89. An analogous problem is raised when two suits are conducted concurrently.
If either is binding as "technical" res judicata, it is often a matter of chance which is
the first decided. See Church v. Gallic, 76 Ark. 423, 88 S.W. 979 (1905) ; Hoffstetter
v. George M. Myener Constr., Inc., 170 Kan. 464, 227 P.2d 115 (1951) ; Brice v. Starr,
90 Wash. 369, 156 Pac. 12 (1916).
90. 86 Minn. 365, 90 N.W. 767 (1902). See text following note 33 supra.
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the suffering of irreparable injury. However, to support the claim for
money damages, the plaintiff must document the precise manner in which
he has suffered losses and the precise extent of those losses. Frequently
procedural codes demand that claims for damages be averred with precision
and particularity.9 1 As a result, it is quite likely that in many instances a
plaintiff will be able to win his equitable relief before his legal case is
completed. If the rule of a complete settlement of the entire controversy in
one trial is enforced, the plaintiff will have to forego either speedy equitable
relief or recovery of both the equitable and the legal remedies.
Related to the problem of timing of recovery is the second aspect of
imperfect fusion of law and equity which can result in the plaintiff receiving a smaller recovery than would have been received under pre-code practice. This concerns the different treatment of law and equity in the
granting of damages for injury suffered after the initiation of the suit but
before the close of trial. "It is sometimes said broadly that in actions at
law damages are given only to the commencement of the action, but in
equity to the time of trial." 92 More accurately, in an action at law plaintiff
cannot recover for injuries sustained as a result of the defendant's violating
a continuing duty after commencement of the action; law courts do allow
recovery for injury suffered after the action is begun if that injury is
attributable to a delict of the defendant committed before that time.93
Equity, however, had a rule of convenience: full damages were awarded
for all injury in order to terminate the controversy." This comported with
the spirit of granting equitable clean-up.
From either of these procedures, then, the plaintiff was assured a full
measure of damages. Under fusion, however, the confusion which was
noted earlier about the character of a trial for purposes of jury trial is
also found found here. In a "split trial" for example, the one issue that
seems clearly to fall within the province of the jury is that of damages.
Presumably, therefore, the measure of those damages will be that of former
law practice. The differences in the way that evidence is marshalled for
consideration by the judge as compared with that for the jury justified the
more flexible rule of equitable clean-up cases. But in presenting a case
to a jury, there must be greater safeguards against misleading them, and
consequently we have, among other procedures, the rules of full pleading
of damage claims which set the cut-off point in damage consideration at
91. See CLAnx, CODE PLEADING 329-30 (2d ed. 1947).
92. McCoascN, DaMAGES 47 (1935).
93. The type of case involved is that in which defendant's delict is negative in
character, i.e., generally allowing a condition to go on which he is under a legal duty
to change. Examples are the continuing trespass or nuisance and some breaches of
contract. Id. at 49-51. It includes those delicts which frequently entitle the plaintiff to
a combination of legal and equitable remedies: injunction plus damages. The distinction between cases where recovery of damages for injury occurring after commencement of the action is or is not allowed is seen in a comparison of Chicago & N.Y. Ry.
v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339 (1878)

and N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Bahne, 213 Ill. 636, 73 N.E.

322 (1905).
94. McCoamicir, op. cit. rugpra note 92, at 51.
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the commencement of the action. In some cases this would seem to work
to the financial detriment of the plaintiff.
The Right To Amend the Pleadings
A third area in which the operation of "technical" res judicata on a
law-equity case leads to an unhappy result is in the effect of the pleadings
as controlling the course of a trial and the freedom to amend. This is a
problem in those jurisdictions which, although they have modified and
reformed their procedural law, still require that the pleadings be cast in
terms of the older legal or equitable actions. A fairly recent New York
decision sets up the problem. In International Recording Machines, Inc.
v. Microstat Corp.,9 5 a suit was brought for reformation of a contract.
The trial court found no basis for reformation, but went on to hold that
a case of breach of contract had been shown and awarded damages to the
plaintiff therefor. The appellate division reversed because the pleadings
alleged a suit in equity while the judgment was not equitable but legal.9 6
Any restriction on the right to amend the pleadings, particularly to
amend to conform to the evidence, is insofar a requirement that the course
of the trial be controlled by the pleadings. Where such a practice is found,
there will be serious miscarriage of justice if the doctrine of "technical"
res judicata is also employed to preclude overcoming the failings of the
first trial by a second suit. Perhaps the clearest example is the converse
of the Microstat case. A party to a contract sues for breach thereof and
discovers that he is unable to recover because of certain provisions in the
contract, which he argues are inapplicable. In order to convert his legal
action for breach of contract into an equitable suit to reform the contract,
there must be either freedom to amend or leave to begin the litigation
afresh. If neither opportunity is available, a result closely akin to the
common law is achieved whereby the parties are seriously hurt by faults at
the pleading stage of a trial.

CONCLUSION
The proper relationship doctrine of "technical" res judicata, or its
counterpart, election of remedies, and the procedural opportunities for
settlement of an entire controversy in one trial is not simple to determine.
The answer that has found favor among some advocates of code pleading
is deceptively easy. They argue that litigants should be compelled to take
advantage of the increased liberality of code pleading, but underlying this
95. 269 App. Div. 485, 56 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1st Dep't 1945).
96. The opinion of the trial court, International Photo Recording Machines, Inc.
v. Microstat Corp., 183 Misc. 394, 48 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1944), was reversed.
The appellate division's decision was distinguished in April Productions, Inc. v.
Schirmer, 131 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 308 N.Y. 366,
126 N.E.2d 283 (1955). See also Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 139 F.2d
542 (2d Cir. 1944).
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conclusion is the premise that the one trial under fusion does not alter the
legal rights of the parties under the former practice. However, it is
found that procedure under code pleading does not always completely
approximate practice where there has been no fusion of law and equity.
Consequently, cases will arise in which one or other of the parties is, or
deems himself to be, prejudiced if the opportunity for separate trials is
denied. Moreover, the legal device whereby that division of the controversy is precluded is the doctrine of "technical" res judicata, one of the
few procedural rules carrying the absolute penalty of preclusion of all
remedy regardless of the substantive merit of the claim. Its application to
this latter problem, like many other legal questions, comes down to a weighing of conflicting or competing desires. The ultimate question is whether
the loss, in terms of the rationale of res judicata, which would be caused
by allowing litigants to forego the opportunity of combining requests for
legal and equitable remedies if they so desire, justifies preventing them
from proceeding in separate trials. If it may be assumed that most litigants
will be happy to take advantage of the opportunity to settle their entire
controversy in one trial, then the balance seems to favor leaving open the
possibility of dividing the case into its legal and equitable parts in those
cases in which the rights of the parties would be altered if only one proceeding is allowed.

